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Abstract: Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. The view 
is widely taken to be absurd: if a theory can be shown to entail epiphenomenalism, many see 
that as a reductio of that theory. Opponents take epiphenomenalism to be absurd because they 
regard the view as undermining the evident agency we have in action and precluding 
substantial self-knowledge. In this paper, I defend epiphenomenalism against these 
objections, and thus against the negative dialectical role that the view plays in philosophy of 
mind. I argue that nearly in all cases where a theory implies one kind of epiphenomenalism, it 
is an epiphenomenalism of a non-problematic kind, at least as far as issues about agency and 
self-knowledge are concerned. There is indeed a problematic version of epiphenomenalism, 
but that version is not relevant to the debates where its apparent absurdity is invoked. 
1. Introduction 
Epiphenomenalism denies some or all putative cases of mental causation. Of course, for 
epiphenomenalism to be an interesting view, its denial of mental causation must be 
systematic and non-trivial. It must be systematic, for if you allow that mental 
states/events/properties generally cause various sorts of events, but insist that your neighbour 
Frank’s beliefs last weekend were causally inefficacious, that shouldn’t make you an 
epiphenomenalist. By contrast, if you hold that Frank’s and his conspecifics’ beliefs and 
other intentional mental states can never cause anything, your denial of mental causation is 
systematic enough to warrant epiphenomenalism. The denial of mental causation must be 
non-trivial because if you are an eliminativist and reject the very existence of mental 
states/events/properties, you will also deny all putative cases of mental causation purely 
because you don’t think there are any mental states/events/properties. But again, that should 
not make you an epiphenomenalist. As we shall shortly see, there are many ways of 
systematically and non-trivially denying mental causation, and hence being an 
epiphenomenalist.  
In the contemporary literature, with a handful of exceptions, no one ardently defends 
epiphenomenalism.1 Instead, the view often figures in reductio arguments in philosophy of 
mind. Consequently, many have sought to show that their views don’t lead to 
epiphenomenalism, which has led to the development of subtly different accounts of mental 
causation and sophisticated theories of causation more generally. Fodor calls the general 
attitude in philosophy of mind towards this view “epiphobia”: the fear that one’s view implies 
 
1 See Robinson (2018) for a full-fledged defence of epiphenomenalism. In Robinson’s use, 
“epiphenomenalism” refers to a positive claim about what mental phenomena are and how they are 
caused, as well as the negative claim that mental phenomena do not cause anything. Throughout the 
paper, I will take “epiphenomenalism” to refer to the negative claim which denies the causal efficacy 
of some or all mental phenomena. See Lyons (2006) and Tammelleo (2008) for other defences of 
epiphenomenalism in this negative sense. 
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epiphenomenalism (1990: 137). Agreeing that epiphenomenalism must be avoided, Fodor 
proclaims that 
if it isn’t literally true that my wanting is causally responsible for my reaching, and my itching 
is causally responsible for my scratching, and my believing is causally responsible for my 
saying …, if none of that is literally true, then practically everything I believe about anything 
is false and it’s the end of the world (ibid: 156). 
Similarly, Horgan thinks that epiphenomenalism is an “outrageous offense against common-
sense” (1987: 504), suggesting that it “should be an utter last resort, to be embraced only if 
all viable alternatives prove to be even more paradoxical and untenable than 
epiphenomenalism itself” (ibid.). Others have called it “truly incredible” (McLaughlin 1994: 
284), and suggested that “there is no real hope that epiphenomenalism could become a 
credible view” (Burge 1993: 112). But, what is so wrong about epiphenomenalism?  
Although there are several arguments that have been advanced against epiphenomenalism, 
two of these stand out in suggesting not only that the view is false, but also that it is a good 
thing that it is false, as it has highly undesirable consequences. First, for those who think that 
agency in action requires mental causation, epiphenomenalism undermines agency in action, 
and hence presumably free will. In Kim’s words, “we care about mental causation, … chiefly 
because we care about human agency” (2009: 44). In his recent book-length defence of free 
will, List (2019) spends a whole chapter arguing against epiphenomenalism, as he thinks 
epiphenomenalism threatens freedom in action: “the relevant actions of any bearer of free 
will are caused, not merely by some nonintentional physical processes, but by the appropriate 
mental states” (ibid.: 24-25). Epiphenomenalism is then found problematic, as it is a non-
negotiable fact that we are free agents of our actions. Second, epiphenomenalism is alleged to 
have unacceptable epistemological consequences. On the assumption that what is known 
must have some causal import, in particular on the knowing subject, epiphenomenalism 
implies that we can’t know other minds, and more worryingly, we can’t know even our own 
minds or mental states. As Moore puts it, “a necessary condition for the report that I was in 
pain to be counted as knowledge is that it was caused by the qualitative pain event itself” 
(2012: 630; see also De Brigard 2014). That we have such self-knowledge is very intuitive, 
hence epiphenomenalism seems to fly in the face of this intuitive fact.  
I believe epiphobia draws its strength from these two arguments more so than others that we 
can find in the literature2, as these two arguments target our pre-theoretical intuitions about 
ourselves and our place in nature: we are free agents and we know our own minds. For this 
reason, in my assessment of epiphobia, I shall focus on these two arguments. I shall call these 
the argument from agency and the argument from self-knowledge respectively. 
I am not an epiphenomenalist, but I am dissatisfied with the negative dialectical role 
epiphenomenalism has come to play in contemporary philosophy of mind. Thus, I propose to 
reassess the status of epiphenomenalism. To do this, I will explore answers to two intertwined 
questions. First, is epiphenomenalism really the undesirable view that the arguments from 
agency and self-knowledge seem to suggest? Second, do otherwise tenable views fall due to 
 
2 Other arguments against epiphenomenalism appeal to natural selection (Popper and Eccles 1977: 73-
4), metaphysics of causation (e.g. Menzies 2003; Kroedel 2019), properties (e.g. Baysan 2018), and 
metaphysics of mind-body relations (e.g. Shoemaker 2001). See Walter (2009a) for further 
discussion. 
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entailing epiphenomenalism? I will motivate largely negative answers to both of these 
questions.  
The paper has two parts. In the first part (Sections 2 and 3), I argue that there are various 
epiphenomenalist views, and most of these views are largely unaffected by the arguments 
from agency and self-knowledge. I argue for this by showing that the kinds of 
epiphenomenalism discussed in various debates in philosophy of mind are not really contrary 
to the intuitions that motivate these two arguments. In the second part (Section 4), I argue that 
some views that are often criticised for entailing a particularly worrisome kind of 
epiphenomenalism actually don’t entail that kind of epiphenomenalism. They might imply 
the kinds of epiphenomenalism discussed in the first part of the paper, but as I will have 
shown, those kinds of epiphenomenalism don’t fall prey to the arguments from agency and 
self-knowledge. The conclusion I draw from these is that epiphenomenalism doesn’t deserve 
its negative dialectical role. This shows that some views that are adopted mainly because 
their alternatives lead to epiphenomenalism are not well-motivated. Throughout the paper, I 
will highlight examples of such views. 
2. Varieties of epiphenomenalism  
Let’s start with understanding epiphenomenalism better. A very strong form of 
epiphenomenalism denies any kind of causal efficacy of any kind of mental 
state/event/property in relation to any kind of putative effect. Call this view 
“Epiphenomenalism” (with capital “E”).3 On this view, beliefs, desires, sensations, conscious 
experiences, and anything that populates one’s mental life simply have no causal role in 
anything whatsoever.  
It goes without saying that Epiphenomenalism is a very strong view, and there are at least 
three ways one can weaken it and still retain an epiphenomenalist position. First, one might 
think that only some kinds of mental states/events/properties lack causal efficacy while others 
do have causal efficacy. For example, one might think that qualitative properties instantiated 
by conscious experiences are epiphenomenal, while intentional mental states are not. Second, 
one might believe that mental states/events/properties have causal efficacy in relation to 
further mental states/events/properties, but not in relation to the physical domain; perhaps 
conscious experiences cause other conscious experiences or intentional mental states, but 
they have no “downwards” causal powers. Third, one might take mental 
states/events/properties to have causal efficacy in one sense, while not in an allegedly more 
important sense. For example, one could argue that mental events are sometimes causes of 
some subsequent events, but they are not causes of these subsequent events in virtue of being 
mental events. To understand this idea, consider the sense of mental causation coined by 
Horgan as “mental quausation”: where mental states are causes qua mental states (Horgan 
1989). So, on this third way of weakening Epiphenomenalism, we are considering views 
which accept mental causation, but deny mental quausation.  
These three different ways of weakening Epiphenomenalism are orthogonal, hence there is an 
eight-way partitioning of the logical space for epiphenomenalist views:  
 
3 Henceforth, when “E” is capitalised, I mean to refer to this full-strength form of epiphenomenalism. 
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I. Epiphenomenalism (with capital “E”): No mental entity4 has any causal efficacy, in 
any sense in any domain.  
II. Quausal epiphenomenalism: No mental entity has any causal efficacy in any 
substantial sense (though some mental entities may have causal efficacy in a non-
substantial sense) in the physical or any other domain.5  
III. Downward epiphenomenalism: No mental entity has any causal efficacy, in any sense, 
in the physical domain (though some mental entities may have causal efficacy in other 
domains).  
IV. Downward quausal epiphenomenalism: No mental entity has any causal efficacy in 
any substantial sense (though some mental entities may have causal efficacy in a non-
substantial sense) in the physical domain (though some mental entities may have 
causal efficacy in other domains). 
V. Partial epiphenomenalism: Some (but not all) mental entities lack causal efficacy, in 
any sense, in any domain.  
VI. Partial quausal epiphenomenalism: Some (but not all) mental entities lack causal 
efficacy in a substantial sense in any domain; though they may have causal efficacy in 
a non-substantial sense.   
VII. Partial downward epiphenomenalism: Some (but not all) mental entities lack causal 
efficacy, in any sense, in the physical domain (though they may have causal efficacy 
in other domains).  
VIII. Partial downward quausal epiphenomenalism: Some (but not all) mental entities lack 
causal efficacy in any substantial sense (though they may have causal efficacy in a 
non-substantial sense) in the physical domain; they may have causal efficacy (in the 
relevant sense) in other domains.  
In the contemporary mental causation debate, Epiphenomenalism (I)---the strongest 
epiphenomenalist position on our list---is usually portrayed as an implausible consequence of 
non-reductive physicalism and (anti-physicalist) property dualism.6 Non-reductive 
physicalism is the variety of physicalism according to which mental properties are not 
identical with physical properties.7 Property dualism is similar to non-reductive physicalism 
in denying the reducibility of mental properties to physical properties, but differs from it as it 
rejects physicalism. It is often argued that these views imply Epiphenomenalism based on the 
consideration that only physical properties can be causally relevant or efficacious. The 
argument in support of this consideration is the topic of Section 4. 
Some views in philosophy of mind are criticised for entailing quausal epiphenomenalism (II) 
or the related views of downward quausal epiphenomenalism (IV), partial quausal 
epiphenomenalism (VI), and partial downward quausal epiphenomenalism (VIII). To 
 
4 Henceforth, I use “entity” in a generic sense to cover states, processes, events, properties. 
5 As with the term “mental quausation”, I borrow “quausal epiphenomenalism” from Horgan (1989: 
51). 
6 Since both views are traditionally characterised as views about mental properties, I will take the 
kind of epiphenomenalism that they are alleged to imply to be epiphenomenalism about mental 
properties. 
7 Thus, the so-called “token-identity” theory (discussed in the next paragraph) is not a form of 
reductive physicalism according to my construal.  
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illustrate these, I will focus on one widely-discussed example of partial downward quausal 
epiphenomenalism. Recall that this is the type of view whereby (only) some kinds of mental 
states lack downward quausal efficacy. For this, consider anomalous monism, defended by 
Davidson (1971). On this view, propositional attitudes are identical with physical events, but 
this identity holds only at the token level. Propositional attitudes are not type-identical with 
physical events because different tokens of the very same propositional attitude type could 
fall under different physical event types. Davidson’s argument for this token-identity thesis 
proceeds by laying out the following claims: (i) some propositional attitudes cause physical 
events; (ii) causation requires subsumption under a strict causal law; and (iii) there are no 
strict causal laws that subsume propositional attitudes and physical events. These three claims 
lead to a puzzle which is solved thanks to the claim that every propositional attitude that is a 
cause of a physical event is identical with a physical event. Since there are strict causal laws 
that subsume physical events, propositional attitudes (which are identical with physical 
events) can be causes of physical events. Anomalous monism surely doesn’t imply 
Epiphenomenalism, as it is a part of the view that mental events cause physical events. But 
there is a worry that anomalous monism fails to explain an important sense in which mental 
events cause physical events. The worry is that, on this view, mental events cause physical 
events, but not in virtue of being mental events; instead, they cause physical events in virtue 
of being physical events. That is, mental events are not causes qua mental, but they are 
causes qua physical; there may be mental causation but there is no mental quausation.8 
Hence, if such worries are well-founded, we have an example of partial downward quausal 
epiphenomenalism. Those who think this kind of epiphenomenalism is unacceptable think 
that token-identity is not enough, and we should hold a type-identity theory (see Kim 1989; 
1998: 37). 
Consider downward epiphenomenalism (III) and partial downward epiphenomenalism (VII) 
next. Articulated in terms of properties, downward epiphenomenalism is the view that mental 
properties don’t have “downwards” causal powers: they may have causal powers in relation 
to events that involve property instantiations at the mental level, but not at the physical level. 
For example, beliefs, desires, and conscious experiences may cause other mental phenomena, 
but they don’t cause any physical phenomena. This view assumes that there are different 
levels of reality, that the mental level is a higher-level compared to the physical level, and 
also that mental properties are not identical with physical properties. A notable example of a 
view which posits downwards causal powers for mental properties is emergentism (see 
McLaughlin 1992; to be discussed in Section 4 below).  
A much-discussed example of partial downward epiphenomenalism is the view that is 
associated with Jackson (1982): qualia, namely the properties of some mental states in virtue 
of which there is something it’s like to have them, don’t have downwards causal powers.9 On 
this view, qualia are non-physical properties. With the assumption that the physical domain is 
 
8 See Sosa (1984), Horgan (1989), and McLaughlin (1989). The same point is sometimes articulated 
in a slightly different ontological language. For example, sometimes, the worry is that, in Davidson’s 
view, there is mental causation, but mental properties do not have any role in this; all the causal work 
is done by physical properties. I find this way of presenting this point misleading, as Davidson doesn’t 
present anomalous monism in terms of properties. In Davidson’s view, “it is events that have causes 
and effects … [I]t makes no literal sense to speak of an event causing something … by virtue of its 
mental properties” (1993: 13).  
9 I discuss qualia epiphenomenalism in detail in Baysan (2019b). 
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causally closed (a point we will visit in Section 4), this view is said to imply that qualia can’t 
have physical effects. Why is this claim restricted to downward causation? The reason is that 
the defenders of this view accept that qualia may have effects insofar as these effects are not 
in the physical domain (ibid.: 133). For example, the reddish quale of my visual experience 
could causally contribute to my awareness of a red object in front of me (where such 
awareness is a mental state), but it doesn’t have any causal role with respect to the physical 
properties of my nervous system. Those who think that it is absurd that qualia are 
epiphenomenal in this sense look for ways of defending a physicalist account of qualia (see 
Horgan 1987). 
Qualia epiphenomenalism needn’t be understood as an example of downward 
epiphenomenalism. One could simply hold that qualia don’t have any causal powers 
whatsoever, in which case qualia epiphenomenalism would be an example of partial 
epiphenomenalism (V). Another interesting example of partial epiphenomenalism, at least as 
far as some opponents of the view are concerned, is the kind of picture that is implied by 
externalism about mental content (henceforth, externalism). Roughly, externalism is the view 
that contents of some intentional mental states don’t supervene on the intrinsic properties of 
the bearers of such intentional states. Some mental states are such that possessing them 
requires being appropriately related to certain things in one’s environment (Putnam 1975; 
Burge 1979). For example, if the transparent, odourless, liquid substance you call “water” is 
not actually water but a different substance, XYZ, the thoughts that you express by using the 
word “water” are not about water. The kind of content that doesn’t supervene on intrinsic 
properties is wide content. Those who think that causation is an intrinsic matter and the causal 
powers of an entity supervene on its intrinsic properties (Fodor 1991) argue that externalism 
implies a kind of epiphenomenalism: mental states with wide content don’t have causal 
powers (partial epiphenomenalism); or if they do, not in virtue of their content (partial 
quausal epiphenomenalism). Those who think that this sort of epiphenomenalism is 
unacceptable either try to show ways of explaining the causal relevance of wide content (see 
Dretske 1990) or explore other notions of mental content (see Fodor 1991).10  
Having presented various examples of epiphenomenalist positions, I have so far passed no 
judgement on whether there is anything wrong with any of these views. In the next section, I 
will revisit the two central arguments against epiphenomenalism (the argument from agency 
and the argument from self-knowledge), and explore to what extent they are relevant to the 
epiphenomenalist positions we have seen in this section. 
3. The Arguments from Agency and Self-Knowledge 
3.1 The Argument from Agency 
The argument from agency suggests that we should reject epiphenomenalism on the grounds 
that it deprives us of agency in action. The worry is that without being agents with the 
 
10 Another partial epiphenomenalist position may hold that mental content in general---not only wide 
content---is causally irrelevant. Since wide content epiphenomenalism is motivated by the assumption 
that causation is an intrinsic matter---i.e. causal powers supervene on intrinsic properties---I don’t 
know what could motivate such a strong version of partial epiphenomenalism, hence I will not discuss 
this position below. Suffice it to say that a view along these lines will be virtually indistinguishable 
from Epiphenomenalism, hence my remarks on Epiphenomenalism may easily apply to it.  
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capacity to act, we wouldn’t have free will, and without free will, we wouldn’t have moral 
responsibility, thus epiphenomenalism seems to undermine free will and moral responsibility. 
Of course, this way of putting things assumes that free will requires agency, and that moral 
responsibility requires free will---I will take these assumptions for granted. My question in 
this section is: Does epiphenomenalism really deprive us of agency in action? The answer is 
not that simple, because we don’t have one epiphenomenalism, but many. 
Assuming that free will requires the capacity to act, and that this capacity requires some of 
our mental states to be causes of our actions, it seems to follow that the argument from 
agency is spot on with respect to Epiphenomenalism (with capital “E”). As previously noted, 
two views in the literature that allegedly imply Epiphenomenalism are non-reductive 
physicalism and non-physicalist property dualism, views that I will turn to in Section 4.  
What about partial epiphenomenalism? This is the view---or better, the family of views---
according to which only some kinds of mental states or properties are epiphenomenal. 
Whether the argument from agency is successful against partial epiphenomenalism depends 
on what part of mentality we are considering. As previously noted, two notable versions of 
partial epiphenomenalism are qualia epiphenomenalism and wide content epiphenomenalism. 
Let’s consider both positions.  
If qualia epiphenomenalism is true, then qualia are epiphenomenal properties. Qualia are 
properties of experiences in virtue of which such experiences are experiences---in virtue of 
which there is something it’s like to be in them. So, qualia epiphenomenalism is explicitly 
committed to the claim that “the properties in virtue of which we are conscious are not 
properties in virtue of which events causally contribute to our behaviour” (Robinson 2020: 
27). On this view, the painfulness of Hilda’s pain experience upon touching a very hot stove 
doesn’t have any causal role in her saying “ouch!”, or moving her hand away from the hot 
stove. Does this problematise or undercut Hilda’s capacity to act in anyway? Clearly not, as 
this is a case of a reflexive behaviour, and not a case of action.  
But suppose, just a moment later, upon reflecting on her persisting painful experience, Hilda 
decides to run cold water on her hand, and then successfully executes this plan. If painfulness 
is epiphenomenal---as the qualia epiphenomenalist believes---then it doesn’t play any causal 
role in the successful execution of Hilda’s plan. From this, does it follow that Hilda’s running 
cold water on her hand is not a free act, or that Hilda is not the agent of this action? I think 
not, as it is not clear to me that the causal powers of qualia have much to do with having or 
lacking the capacity to act. It would be odd if Hilda’s pain experience had nothing to do with 
the fact that she runs cold water on her hand given that she seems to decide to do so upon 
having a pain experience. In general, it would be very undesirable if we were systematically 
wrong about the aetiology of our actions. But it is important to note that qualia 
epiphenomenalism doesn’t say that our experiences don’t have any causal role in our actions. 
It says that the qualia that are instantiated by our experiences don’t have any causal role. So, 
even if qualia epiphenomenalism is true, it can still be true that Hilda’s pain experience plays 
a causal role in her action. On the assumption that qualia epiphenomenalism is true, what is 
false is the claim that the painfulness of this pain experience is part of the causal story. It may 
turn out that a view whereby pain experiences are causes but painfulness doesn’t have causal 
role in this is false. But falsehood is not my question here; the question is whether this view 
undermines agency. I see no reason to believe that it does.  
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Am I assuming that an experience can be a cause without the qualia that are constitutive of 
that experience playing any causal roles? Well, I am assuming that, according to qualia 
epiphenomenalism, this is can be---and indeed is---the case. But in so doing, I am also 
assuming that this is a coherent metaphysical picture. I want to stand by this assumption, 
because I think it is plausible that not all properties of causing events are causally relevant to 
their effects. Suppose I throw a brick at a window, and the window breaks. As it happens, the 
brick is red. Surely, the mass and the rigidity of the brick are causally relevant to the 
breaking; but not all properties of the brick are causally relevant to the breaking. So, some 
properties of the brick-throwing event (e.g., it being a red-brick-throwing event) are causally 
irrelevant, although the event itself is surely causally efficacious to the breaking in virtue of 
its causally relevant properties. The qualia epiphenomenalist---for reasons of her own---
thinks that qualia are further examples of causally irrelevant properties of causally efficacious 
events. 
Here, one might object that I am ignoring an important sense in which qualia of our 
experiences seem relevant to our actions. When Hilda provides reasons for her actions, she 
sometimes cites the qualitative aspects of her experiences. She says that the painfulness of 
her experience is why she is running cold water on her hand. Likewise, when she acts in ways 
such that she is pursuing pleasant experiences, her actions are motivated by the pleasantness 
of some past experiences that are similar to the ones that she is pursuing. If qualia are 
epiphenomenal, how can we make sense of these facts? Well, the answer is that if qualia 
epiphenomenalism is true, these are not facts. What is important is that these not being facts 
doesn’t undermine the fact that Hilda’s mental states cause her action. If these are not facts, 
then there is a sense in which our claims to be ideal agents are seriously compromised. But 
the argument from agency doesn’t rest on the assumption that we are ideal agents. And even 
if it did, so much the worse for it: we are often wrong about the reasons for our actions, we 
sometimes fail from the weakness of the will, and these already seem to show that we are not 
ideal agents. If qualia epiphenomenalism is true, then there is yet one more reason why we 
are not ideal agents. However, none of this means that we lack the capacity to act and free 
will. 
The more relevant examples of mental states, as far as agency is concerned, are propositional 
attitudes. Consider the following simplified example. Upon hearing knocking, I believe that 
someone is at the door, and want to find out who is at the door; the pairing of my belief and 
desire causes me to open the door. Should it turn out that beliefs and desires can never be 
causes, scenarios like this may never obtain. We have seen that one example of partial 
epiphenomenalism holds that intentional mental states with wide content are epiphenomenal. 
On the assumption that externalism is true, beliefs and desires are standard examples of 
intentional mental states that have wide content. Then, one might think that this kind of 
partial epiphenomenalism is undermined by the argument from agency.  
But the problem is merely apparent. If wide content epiphenomenalism were to be understood 
as the view that the beliefs and desires that are the vehicles of wide content are 
epiphenomenal, on the view that all beliefs and desires have only wide content, wide content 
epiphenomenalism would undermine our capacity to act as agents. But there is no reason to 
understand wide content epiphenomenalism as a view about the vehicles of wide content. In 
fact, if we were to understand vehicles of content in the standard sense, namely as “physical 
particulars that bear contents and whose causal interactions explain behaviour” (Shea 2018: 
15, emphasis added), wide content epiphenomenalism, understood as a view about vehicles 
of wide content, would be self-contradictory. 
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Suppose that externalism is true for intentional mental states, and my belief that there is water 
in the bathtub is not a belief that my Twin Earth doppelganger (around whom there is XYZ, 
not water) shares with me. Instead, my doppelganger believes that there is XYZ in the 
bathtub. Suppose, upon believing that there is water in the bathtub, I put my toddler in the 
bath. If it is true that this view implies that wide content is epiphenomenal, it follows from 
this view that the fact that the content of my belief corresponds to water (and not to XYZ) has 
no causal role whatsoever in my putting my toddler in the bath. Something that does not 
follow from this view is that my belief, i.e. the vehicle of the relevant content, has no causal 
role in my putting the poor creature in the bath. Again, this view may be false, but it is not 
obvious at all that it implies that my beliefs are not causes of my actions.  
As I suggested in Section 2, there is reason to formulate wide content externalism as a 
quausal epiphenomenalist view: my belief that there is water in the bathtub causes me to put 
my toddler in the bath, but not in virtue of being a belief about water. Let’s consider the 
quausal versions of epiphenomenalism in relation to the argument from agency. 
I believe none of the quausal variants of epiphenomenalism fall prey to the argument from 
agency; at least, not very easily. There is no reason to treat the four versions of quausal 
epiphenomenalism separately, as I think the same point applies to all. For us to lack the 
capacity to act, for us to cease to be agents, what is required is that our mental states fail to 
cause our actions. If my beliefs and desires are causes of my actions, but not in virtue of 
being beliefs and desires (or not in virtue of having the relevant wide content), I still have the 
capacity to act, my mental states still cause my actions, and hence I am the agent of my 
actions. In other words, mental causation is sufficient for action, mental quausation is 
optional. 
In the forgoing discussion---throughout the last five paragraphs---I have assumed that it is the 
pairings of beliefs and desires that cause actions, and such causings can be sufficient for 
agency in action. One might worry that this assumption is too weak---i.e. too easy to satisfy. 
In particular, if one holds that the relevant mental states that cause action must also provide 
reasons for actions (see Davidson 1963), then it is not clear that causation by the vehicles of 
mental content alone can satisfy the requirement for agency. After all, how can a pure 
vehicle---without reference to a content---provide reason for an action?11 Likewise, if one 
holds, with Mele (1992), that “our desires, beliefs, and the like … help explain behaviour … 
at least partly in virtue of their content” (ibid.: 11, emphasis added), and moreover that such 
explanation is a requirement for agency in action, then it is probably false that mental 
causation without mental quausation can ever be sufficient for agency in action. From this, it 
follows that this particular epiphenomenalist position---i.e. wide content epiphenomenalism 
understood as a quausal epiphenomenalist view---is in tension with the so-called “standard” 
causal theory of action which subscribes to these claims.12 This is bad news for wide content 
epiphenomenalism insofar as the argument from agency is presented with the assumption of 
the causal theory of action in the background. Upon reflection, this shouldn’t come as a 
surprise: the causal theory of action seems to require exactly what wide content 
epiphenomenalism (and quausal epiphenomenalism more generally) explicitly rejects: mental 
 
11 Thanks to an anonymous referee for pressing me on this point and putting this problem in these 
words. 
12 See also Aguilar & Buckareff (2010) for a helpful discussion of the causal theory of action. 
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quausation by content. Therefore, although the argument from agency can be mounted 
against wide content epiphenomenalism, wide content epiphenomenalists can resist it by 
rejecting the standard causal theory of action.  
Hence, putting Epiphenomenalism aside, I have argued that epiphenomenalist views or 
epiphenomenalist implications of some views are largely unaffected by the argument from 
agency. I shall now turn to the argument from self-knowledge. 
3.2 The Argument from Self-Knowledge  
The main epistemological worry about epiphenomenalism that I shall focus on is about the 
possibility of self-knowledge, or knowledge of one’s own mind. An important background 
assumption in presenting this problem is that knowledge requires causal relevance, so what is 
known has some causal relation to the knowing agent’s knowledge (Goldman 1967: 358-9). 
The worry is that, if our mental states don’t have any causal relevance, how do we get to 
know them? The argument from self-knowledge is motivated by the intuitive power of this 
worry.  
Assuming either knowledge is a mental state or a knowing subject’s beliefs that partially 
constitute her knowledge are mental states, if self-knowledge requires mental causation, it 
requires same-level causation, not downward causation. Because of this, I will set downward 
version of epiphenomenalism aside. I will also leave Epiphenomenalism aside (until Section 
4). That leaves us three versions to consider: partial epiphenomenalism (in particular qualia 
epiphenomenalism and wide content epiphenomenalism), quausal epiphenomenalism, and 
partial quausal epiphenomenalism.  
Let’s start with qualia epiphenomenalism as an example of partial epiphenomenalism. The 
worry is that qualia epiphenomenalism implies that the knowledge of qualia is not possible: I 
can’t know the qualia of my own experiences. Read one way, this is very dramatic. If we 
equate the “qualia” talk with “what it’s like” talk, it might even sound like this view suggests 
that I can’t know what it’s like for me to see something red when I see something red. 
However, as I shall argue, even coupled with the background assumption of a causal theory 
of knowledge, qualia epiphenomenalism doesn’t imply any of this.  
There are two different ways of understanding qualia and how they might relate to our 
knowledge of them. On the first understanding, qualia are simply properties of our 
experiences in virtue of which there is something it’s like to have these experiences. This 
understanding is neutral on whether we are meant to be acquainted in our consciousness with 
the very properties (or instances thereof) that are responsible for our consciousness. So, on 
this understanding, knowledge of our own experiences doesn’t require any form of direct 
acquaintance with the qualia that are constitutive of our experiences. In other words, this 
understanding of qualia leaves it open as to whether qualia are directly or immediately 
apprehensible in consciousness. Therefore, even if knowledge of an experience requires a 
causal relation that one bears to that experience, such knowledge does not require the causal 
efficacy of qualia that are constitutive of that experience.  
On a second understanding, qualia are not only the properties of our experiences in virtue of 
which there is something it’s like to have these experiences, but they are also the properties 
that we are directly acquainted with in our experiences. Dennett (1988), in his critique of the 
very concept of “qualia”, argues that qualia must be properties of this kind. He says: “since 
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they are properties of my experiences … qualia are essentially directly accessible to the 
consciousness of their experiencer … or qualia are properties of one’s experience with which 
one is intimately or directly acquainted” (ibid.: 385, emphasis added). If qualia, understood 
this way, don’t have causal powers, how could we be acquainted with them? How could they 
cause our acquaintance of them? If they can’t cause our acquaintance of them, then we can’t 
be acquainted with them. This is absurd, and in fact paradoxical, given that we are defining 
qualia partially as properties that we are directly acquainted with.  
I concede that if qualia are to be understood this latter way, and direct acquaintance requires 
causal connection, then we would have an untenable combination of views. Qualia 
epiphenomenalism would not be only implausible, but also paradoxical. However, for this 
very reason, it would be odd for a defender of qualia epiphenomenalism to understand qualia 
as direct objects of our acquaintance and to also hold a causal theory to explain how we are 
acquainted with our qualia.  
In response to this formulation of the argument from self-knowledge, qualia 
epiphenomenalists can do either of the following two things. First, they can reject this second 
way of understanding qualia and simply hold that qualia are properties of our experiences in 
virtue of which we have conscious experiences, but they are not properties that we are 
acquainted with. I believe this is a coherent view, because I don’t think Dennett’s inference---
quoted above---is a valid one. From the fact that F is a property of my experience E, it 
doesn’t follow that by having E, I am directly acquainted with F. To be clear, on this view, 
examples of qualia are not going to be sensory properties, such as phenomenal redness. But 
this is an acceptable result, as phenomenal redness is not a property of an experience---in the 
same way that redness is not a property of a picture of a red tomato. (Some things that 
partially constitute the picture of a red tomato are red, but the picture itself is not red.) On this 
view, when a subject experiences phenomenal redness R, there is something it’s like for her 
to experience R, and this is partially because her experience instantiates a quale Q (where 
Q≠R). 
Second, qualia epiphenomenalists---should they take qualia as properties that we are directly 
acquainted with---can reasonably help themselves to a non-causal account knowledge of 
qualia, or phenomenal knowledge. They can, for example, accept Nagasawa’s (2010) view 
that such acquaintance is a constitutive relation, rather than a causal one: a subject’s 
“phenomenal knowledge about qualia q is partly constituted by q” (ibid: 52). On this view, 
we might want to require a causal connection when explaining our knowledge of objects in 
our external environment, but we don’t need to do this in order to explain our knowledge of 
our own experiences. Whatever the merits of this account of phenomenal knowledge might 
be, it is clear that it is an alternative to the causal account, and it helps qualia 
epiphenomenalists maintain a non-paradoxical position. 
What about wide content epiphenomenalism? If the kind of epiphenomenalism that is 
supposedly implied by externalism is true, then, with the assumption of the causal theory of 
knowledge, it follows that we don’t always know the contents of some of our intentional 
mental states. But consider an alternative option whereby mental states have both wide 
content and narrow content, where the latter is the kind of content that supervenes on the 
intrinsic properties of the bearers of the relevant mental state. Following this alternative 
option, it is possible to argue that when one has a particular belief, one knows only the 
narrow content of the belief. I am not in the business of defending this alternative option; I 
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simply want to note that wide content epiphenomenalists who want to resist the argument 
from self-knowledge have a coherent way of doing so.   
Finally, let’s consider the two relevant versions of quausal epiphenomenalism together. 
Applied to quausal versions of epiphenomenalism, the epistemological worry is that if mental 
states or properties can’t be causally efficacious in virtue of being mental, then we couldn’t 
know, or be acquainted with, them. If this conditional claim is true, then quausal 
epiphenomenalism and its variants imply scepticism about our own minds. The obvious route 
for quausal epiphenomenalists is through denying this conditional claim. Even if a causal 
theory of knowledge is presupposed, from this presupposition alone it doesn’t follow that 
what is known must be known in virtue of all of its properties; some properties of the objects 
of our knowledge may be causally inefficacious. If quausal epiphenomenalism is true, then 
examples of such causally efficacious properties include properties such as being mental: 
some (or all) mental states are such that their being mental is not causally efficacious to how 
they are known. 
All in all, full-strength Epiphenomenalism aside, there is no reasonable version of 
epiphenomenalism that is refuted by the argument from self-knowledge. This, I say, with the 
assumption that the knowledge of one’s own mental states and properties requires a causal 
relation. Of course, if one were to drop this assumption, the argument from self-knowledge is 
unfounded even against full-strength Epiphenomenalism. 
4. Non-reductive physicalism, property dualism, and Epiphenomenalism 
Having argued that relatively weak epiphenomenalist positions cannot be easily dismissed 
based on the arguments from agency and self-knowledge, I will now turn to an assessment of 
Epiphenomenalism, the view which denies mental causation altogether. As I have highlighted 
several times, if agency and self-knowledge are worries for any kind of epiphenomenalism, 
they should be worries for Epiphenomenalism.  
In the contemporary mental causation debate, Epiphenomenalism notably features in the 
causal argument for reductive physicalism: namely the view mental properties are identical 
with physical properties. In a nutshell, the argument is that only physical properties can be 
causally efficacious in a physical world, so if mental properties are not physical properties, 
then they can’t be causally efficacious. Kim’s (1998; 2005) articulation is the paradigmatic 
version of this argument, so I will focus on this version. This is the so-called “exclusion 
argument” for its purported conclusion that any putative non-physical mental cause is 
“excluded” by some purely physical cause. 
The exclusion argument is leveraged against two alternatives to reductive physicalism: non-
reductive physicalism and (non-physicalist) property dualism. The argument has the 
following structure: on the assumption that there is mental causation (i.e. Epiphenomenalism 
is false), commitments of non-reductive physicalism and property dualism, together with 
further assumptions, lead to inconsistent positions. To avoid such inconsistency, non-
reductive physicalists and property dualists can endorse Epiphenomenalism, but 
Epiphenomenalism is an unacceptable position. Hence, these views ought to be rejected, and 
the alternative view, reductive physicalism ought to be accepted. The relevant mutually 
inconsistent claims are the following five: 
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(1) Mental causation. Some mental properties, or instantiations thereof, are causally 
sufficient for some events. (In other words, Epiphenomenalism is false.) 
(2) Causal closure. Every event that has a cause at a time has a sufficient physical cause 
at that time. This is true not only for events at the physical level, but also events that 
supervene on physical events.13  
(3) Exclusion. No event has multiple simultaneous sufficient causes unless it is causally 
overdetermined---i.e. if there are two or more individually sufficient simultaneous 
causes of an event, that event is causally overdetermined.  
(4) No overdetermination. Cases of mental causation are not cases of causal 
overdetermination. For if they were, then the world would contain systematic causal 
overdetermination. There may be rare occasions of causal overdetermination, but 
there is no systematic causal overdetermination. 
(5) Distinctness. Mental properties are not reducible to, or identical with, physical 
properties.  
Let me illustrate the inconsistency of these five claims through our previous example. Upon 
touching the hot stove, Hilda’s pain experience causes her to move her hand. In line with (1) 
above, we have a mental cause (pain experience) and an effect (hand movement). As (2) 
dictates, at the time at which Hilda’s behaviour has a cause, it has a sufficient physical cause. 
Let’s call this sufficient cause “SPC”. Given (5), Hilda’s pain experience (or the relevant 
mental property in virtue of which she has this experience) is not identical with SPC (or the 
relevant physical property in virtue of which SPC obtains). So far, these three suggest that 
there is an event (hand movement), which has multiple simultaneous sufficient causes (a 
mental property and a physical property, or instances thereof). If (3) is true, then this must be 
a case of causal overdetermination. But if (4) is true, this can’t be a case of causal 
overdetermination. Therefore, claims (1)-(5) are mutually inconsistent. Non-reductive 
physicalists and property dualists can achieve consistent positions if they reject (1); hence, 
these views lead to Epiphenomenalism.  
The problem with this argument is that it is not clear why non-reductive physicalists and 
property dualists must accept all of the remaining claims (2)-(5). Since they are not reductive 
physicalists, they have to accept (5). But the remaining options are possible candidates, and 
in what follows, I shall argue that non-reductive physicalists and property dualists could (and 
perhaps should) reject (3) and (2) respectively. 
Property dualists, insofar as they are non-physicalists, needn’t accept (2). Whatever their 
arguments in favour of a non-physicalist position might be, once their view admits 
physicalism-violating, irreducible, sui generis, mental properties, it is not clear why they 
should embrace a principle that is assumed in defending physicalism. A relevant example of a 
property dualist position is emergentism (e.g. Broad 1925; O’Connor 1994). According to a 
standard conception of emergentism (see McLaughlin 1992; Wilson 2015), this view is 
committed to a particularly strong downward causation principle: some higher-level 
properties “influence motion in ways unanticipated by laws governing less complex kinds 
 
13 Sometimes, a weaker version of this claim is endorsed. This weaker claim says that every physical 
event that has a cause at a time has a sufficient physical cause at that time. In the arguments in which 
this weaker version is used, the target cases of mental causation are merely cases of downward 
causation. Since, in this section, I am discussing all putative cases of mental causation, not merely 
downward causation, I will work with this stronger claim of causal closure.  
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and conditions concerning the arrangements of particles” (McLaughlin 1992: 51). This 
principle not only posits downward causation whereby some higher-level goings-on can 
cause some physical goings-on, but also implies a violation of the causal closure of the 
physical domain. If some higher-level properties causally influence physical goings-on in 
ways that physical properties may not (as implied by the principle), then it would seem that 
the causal efficacy of some higher-level properties goes beyond the causal efficacy of 
physical properties. The upshot of this is that a venerable property dualist position 
straightforwardly opposes the idea portrayed in (2), in which case it doesn’t follow that 
property dualists must be cornered into Epiphenomenalism in order to achieve an internally 
coherent position. In other words, property dualism doesn’t have to lead to 
Epiphenomenalism.14  
Unlike property dualists, non-reductive physicalists are not in a position to reject (2). But 
they can reject (3). Non-reductive physicalists, in virtue of being physicalists, are committed 
to a metaphysically necessary connection between mental properties and the physical 
properties they supervene on. For if mental properties don’t metaphysically supervene on 
physical properties, the case for physicalism is undercut (see Chalmers 1996). A case against 
(3) is that once two putative simultaneous causes of a subsequent event are necessarily 
connected such that one necessitates the other, they are not distinct enough to generate causal 
overdetermination.  
An argument by Bennett (2003) illustrates this last point as follows. For two events, A and B, 
to causally overdetermine E, it has to be non-vacuously true that (i) if A hadn’t happened but 
B had happened, then E would still have happened, and (ii) if B hadn’t happened but A had 
happened, then E would still have happened. This, after all, is how we understand causal 
overdetermination in standard “firing-squad” cases: Shooter 1 and Shooter 2 simultaneously 
shoot Victim; each shot is lethal; if Shooter 1 hadn’t fired, Shooter 2 would have, and Victim 
would have still died; if Shooter 2 hadn’t fired, Shooter 1 would have, and Victim would 
have still died. Now, if A is metaphysically necessitated by B, it is not metaphysically 
possible for B to occur without A occurring, which implies that if condition (i) is true, it can 
only be vacuously true. The resulting picture generates a counterexample to (3) because the 
non-reductive physicalist can say that Hilda’s pain experience and SPC are individually 
sufficient simultaneous causes of her behaviour, but they don’t causally overdetermine it; it is 
metaphysically impossible for SPC to obtain without Hilda’s pain experience obtaining.15 
Now, this response to (3)---and more generally to the exclusion argument---is controversial. 
As Morris (2015) argues, this so-called “disanalogy-style” response to the argument rests on 
a problematic dialectic. The counterfactual analysis of overdetermination given in conditions 
(i) and (ii) above is based on standard “text-book” cases of overdetermination (such as the 
firing-squad cases), yet the response ultimately boils down to the claim that the mental-
physical cases are disanalogous to such text-book cases. Moreover, making this point doesn’t 
 
14 It needs to be acknowledged that property dualists can---and indeed sometimes do---accept (2). In 
fact, Robinson’s (2018) Epiphenomenalist brand of property dualism partially rests on the causal 
closure of the physical. In Robinson’s case, it would be dialectically odd to argue against his view for 
implying Epiphenomenalism, as his view is ardently Epiphenomenalist. I am merely suggesting that 
rejecting (2) is a possible option for property dualists who are compelled by the “exclusionist” 
reasoning. 
15 Though, see Keaton & Polger (2014) for problems raised against this latter claim.  
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seem to require to say much about the metaphysics of mind-body relations, and this is a 
further worry raised by critics of the disanalogy-style response. As Morris argues, “it seems 
that the [exclusion] problem has been dismissed without any discussion of either mental 
causation or the metaphysics of non-reductive physicalism” (ibid.: 443).16 Given these 
worries, non-reductive physicalists would do better to look for a way of responding to the 
exclusion argument by illuminating the nature of the relationship between the mental and the 
physical.  
Fortunately, there is a viable non-reductive physicalist position whereby (3) comes out false 
because of the way mental properties are related to the physical properties that realize them 
(and not merely because there are independent counterexamples to it). An account of the 
relationship between mental properties and their realizers that I find particularly promising is 
given by what has come to be known as the “subset view” (Wilson 1999; 2011 Shoemaker 
2001; 2007).17 According to the subset view, a relationship that holds between a mental 
property, M, and its physical realizer, P, is that the causal powers of M are a proper subset of 
the causal powers of P. If this is true, the relevant causal powers of Hilda’s pain experience 
are ultimately “inherited” from the causal powers of SPC. (Here, I am assuming that SPC is a 
realizer of Hilda’s pain experience.) According to Shoemaker’s (2001) version of this theory, 
this implies that Hilda’s pain experience is a proper part of SPC. Since it is implausible that 
wholes and their parts causally overdetermine their effects, we have a counterexample to (3).  
In Wilson’s version of this theory, we don’t have a part-whole relation, but we still have an 
explanation of why Hilda’s pain experience and SPC don’t causally overdetermine their 
effects. According to Wilson, an implication of the proper subset relationship between M’s 
and P’s causal powers is the following: when M is instantiated in virtue of P’s instantiation, 
every causal power of M is token-identical with some causal power of P. When Hilda’s pain 
experience causes her hand movement and SPC causes her hand movement, there is only one 
relevant causal power that is exercised on this very occasion. Given that only one causal 
power is being exercised, it makes little sense to think that M and P causally overdetermine 
E. Therefore, (3) is false. 
So far so good. But doesn’t this type of view still imply Epiphenomenalism? If M’s causal 
powers are inherited from P, wouldn’t it be more appropriate to say that, really, P is the 
cause, and M is epiphenomenal? This position might imply some kind of epiphenomenalism, 
but it doesn’t imply Epiphenomenalism. The worry here seems to be about quausation, not 
causation: if M’s causal powers are ultimately causal powers of physical properties, how 
could M have any causal efficacy in virtue of being mental? So, even if these worries may 
 
16 Morris (2015) also argues that there is a problem with formulating the exclusion problem with (3) 
in the first place, which seems to have counterexamples that have nothing to the with the mental-
physical cases. Counterexamples of this kind can be found in Arnadottir & Crane (2013). He is right 
that the “exclusionist” reasoning could be presented by different arguments which wouldn’t inherit the 
objectionable features of (3). As said above, I am focusing on Kim’s paradigmatic formulation of this 
problem which endorses (3) explicitly (e.g., Kim 2005: 42). 
17 For objections to the subset view, see Gillett (2003), McLaughlin (2007), Morris (2011; 2013), 
Noordhof (2013), and Pineda and Vincente (2017). For more recent defences of the core claim of the 
subset view, see Baysan (2016; 2018; 2019a---which includes replies to some of the aforementioned 
critiques). See also Walter (2009b) for more general worries about “realization-based” strategies for 
saving non-reductive physicalism from Epiphenomenalism.   
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lead to some kind of epiphenomenalism, the kind of epiphenomenalism we get is at best 
quausal epiphenomenalism. My question here is whether we get Epiphenomenalism (with 
capital “E”) from non-reductive physicalism; I have argued that we don’t. If we get quausal 
epiphenomenalism however, that is also fine, as I have argued in Section 3 that quausal 
epiphenomenalism is not as implausible as is commonly assumed, as it doesn’t easily fall 
prey to the arguments from agency and self-knowledge. So, either way, non-reductive 
physicalism is on solid ground---as far as mental causation is concerned anyway.  
To conclude this section, non-reductive physicalism and property dualism don’t imply 
Epiphenomenalism. Non-reductive physicalists don’t have to accept the claim that mental 
properties and their realizers causally overdetermine their effects; and property dualists don’t 
have to accept the causal closure of the physical. If they want to accept these claims and the 
further claims that fuel the exclusion argument, then Epiphenomenalism becomes a choice. 
And if it is a choice, then it makes little sense to argue against these views on the basis of an 
epiphobic reductio. 
5. Conclusion 
Epiphenomenalism is often found problematic---absurd even---as it is thought to undermine 
the evident agency we have in action and preclude substantial self-knowledge. Focusing on 
the arguments from agency and self-knowledge, I have distinguished between various kinds 
of epiphenomenalism, and argued that most of these views cannot be easily dismissed based 
on these two arguments. This of course doesn’t mean that these epiphenomenalist positions 
are true or ultimately defensible, as there may be other reasons why they may not be tenable. 
But it is important to note that they don’t stand or fall with agency and self-knowledge. This 
is a significant result, as I believe the alleged absurdity of epiphenomenalism is motivated by 
pre-theoretical intuitions that support the arguments from agency and self-knowledge. I have 
also argued that there is indeed an epiphenomenalist view that stands out as problematic: the 
full-strength Epiphenomenalist position that denies mental causation altogether. But I showed 
that two notable views that are criticised for implying Epiphenomenalism in fact don’t imply 
it. Based on these results, my conclusion is that epiphenomenalism doesn’t deserve the 
negative dialectical role it has been given. 18 
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